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In 2003, the Brazilian government launched the Bolsa Família Program (BFP) to combat 
severe poverty and inequality. Much literature has explored the effects of the Program on human 
capital and related indicators (literacy rates, child labor participation, etc). Demographic 
literature focuses on whether the Program affects fertility, but this literature does not address 
household fertility decisions of the participants. The purpose of my research is to assess the 
determinants of fertility among the BFP population. This study uses cross-sectional data from 
IGBE’s 2011 National Household Sample Survey. Via the use of a multiple linear regression 
methodology it can be predicted that several variables significantly influence the fertility of BFP 
beneficiaries. Identification of significant variables that influence fertility decisions allows 
policymakers to focus resources to specific individuals and alter their fertility rates. Should 
policymakers seek to influence fertility rates (quantity), then, according to the Beckerian model, 
they also gain the ability to change quality (human capital). 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Demographers and economists have long studied the relationship between poverty and fertility. 
On a macro level, modern economic growth is associated with decreased fertility, beginning with 
high-income countries during the late nineteenth century and followed by low-income countries 
during the late twentieth century. Despite decreased fertility across the board, empirical 
observation in the developing world still show that relatively poorer countries generally have 
higher population growth rates and larger poor households, implying a positive relationship 
between fertility and poverty both at the national and household levels. Poverty and income are 
not the only variables that contribute to fertility among the poor. Economic models relating 
wealth and the production and consumption of time-consuming activities relate changes in 
economic status to their reproductive choices (Becker 1960, Schultz 2001). Other studies 
attribute this decline to increased productivity among agricultural sectors (Craig 1990), 
decreased child mortality rates (Barro and Becker 1989), decreased rates of religiosity (Heaton 
2011), and better education for women (Basu 2002) among other variables. 
Given the rapid decrease in fertility rates among developing countries in recent decades, 
scholars have become increasingly interested in discovering the proximate determinants of 
fertility among the poor (Bongaarts 1978, Bongaarts 1987, Moreno 1991). These studies are 
generally framed in the context of the demographic transition and their results are contrasted to 
developed and developing nations. Although several factors contribute to fertility decisions in 
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poor households, perhaps the most important factors include marriage, contraception, abortion, 
infant mortality, age, income, and education.  
As low-income countries have continually grown in recent decades, they are increasingly 
able to reduce levels of inequality, raise levels of human capital, promote social inclusion and 
upward mobility, and reduce poverty using government-funded policies. Although the 
socioeconomic welfare of individuals that receive these regressive transfers is increasing, many 
of them are still affected by extreme poverty. As developing governments have only 
implemented significant social welfare policies in recent decades, it may prove useful to study 
the determinants of fertility among the populations that benefit from such programs. Until now 
the literature focused on variables that affect fertility on a broad scale but has not explored such 
variables for specific groups, such as welfare recipients. 
This paper studies the determinants of fertility among the population of Bolsa Família 
Program beneficiaries in Brazil. By drawing on literature that study factors that affect fertility, 
this paper validates the findings of other studies. It also contributes to the literature by 
discovering other variables, such as access to technology, which may influence fertility among 
the welfare receiving population in developing countries. Via Becker’s (1961) and Becker and 
Lewis’s (1973) theories on household fertility decisions, this paper provides policymakers a 
unique perspective of how determinants of fertility can ultimately affect child quality or human 
capital.  
This paper is organized as follows. It first provides a statistical overview of the decrease 
in fertility rates over the past fifty years and gives several reasons for this trend. Next, it seeks to 
analyze the proximate determinants of fertility among the poor in developing countries according 
to the literature. The paper then introduces the Beckerian theory of household fertility decisions, 
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emphasizing the quantity-quality tradeoff and how it applies to fertility decisions among Brazil's 
poor. An in-depth history and description of the Bolsa Família Program (BFP) follows, with a 
note on how the program affects fertility. Next the data, methodology, econometric model, 
hypotheses, and identification strategy of BFP beneficiaries are described in detail. The findings 
section highlights the significant variables from the regression models and describes the 
implication of these results in a policy context, with attention to the Beckerian model. It 
concludes with policy recommendations and suggests avenues for future research. 
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2.0  FERTILITY 
Fertility rates in Brazil have declined at a rapid pace. From 1960 to 2010, total fertility rates 
(TFR) fell from a high of 6.3 to a current 1.86. Figure (1) shows that fertility declines were 
fastest in the 1970s and 1980s but have slowed in recent decades. Although fertility is decreasing 
at a slower rate today, Brazil’s fertility rate is now below replacement level. This number is 
surprisingly low for a developing country and is comparable to rates found in developed 
countries such as Denmark and Finland. For reference, Argentina’s total fertility rate in 2010 was 
2.21, Uruguay’s was 1.99, Mexico’s was 2.32, and the United States’ was 2.1 (World Bank). 
With respect to the pace of decline, Brazil’s fertility decreased slightly slower than China and 
Thailand, but much faster than Mexico, India, and Indonesia (Martine 1996, Muniz 2006).  
 
 Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate 1940-2010 
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Source: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), 2010 
Despite TFR decreasing throughout all regions and socio-demographic groups in past decades, 
great interregional variation still exists. The North and Northeast regions have traditionally 
exhibited the highest TFRs, while the Southeast has shown the lowest. In 2010 the TFR in the 
North was 2.47, while it was only 1.70 in the Southeast. The literature often attributes this 
difference to the varied levels of development, different racial composition, religious affiliations, 
urbanization rates, and industrial opportunity observed between the regions. As figure (2) shows, 
TFR declined earlier in the South and Southeast due to the relatively early arrival of industry, 
investment, and modernization. Conversely, the North and Northeast regions boast relatively 
larger rural populations, higher rates of agricultural production, and lower labor market 
participation rates. Although the North and Northeastern regions show the highest decrease in 
TFR during the past decade, historically unequal development rates have not allowed for TFR to 
converge throughout the country. 
  
Figure 2. Regional Variation in Fertility 
Source: IBGE, 2010 
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 The literature generally observes higher TFR in less developed rural regions, which 
traditionally have less access to governmental programs (such as healthcare and contraceptives), 
technology, and are characterized as lower income regions. In Brazil the TFR is significantly 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas, as shown in figures (3) and (4) below. This holds for all 
of Brazil’s five regions in both 2000 and 2010. It is also worth noting that the TFR has decreased 
in both rural and urban settings across all regions. Further, this difference is even more 
significant in the North and Northeast regions. 
  
Figure 3. Urban and Rural Fertility (2000) 
Source: IBGE, 2010 
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Figure 4. Urban and Rural Fertility (2010) 
Source: IBGE, 2010 
 A further analysis of census data also reveals a difference in the TFR between different 
racial groups. The population in Brazil is distributed as follows: 46.2% brown, 44.3% white, 
8.5% black, .51% indigenous, and .5% yellow. On the aggregate, out of the four races in figures 
5 and 6, three decreased their TFR between 2000 and 2010, with the largest decrease found for 
Black at -24.2%, followed by Brown at -23.0%, and White at -20.5%. Interestingly, the total 
Indigenous group’s TFR was higher than that of all other racial groups and remained constant 
throughout the decade We must consider this anomaly in this study.  
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Figure 5. Fertility among Race (2000) 
Source: IBGE, 2010 
  
Figure 6. Fertility Among Race (2010) 
Source: IBGE, 2010 
 Mass communication technologies and entertainment are significant in Brazil’s fertility 
decline in recent years. Technologies such as cell phones, internet, television, and radio allow for 
the mass distribution of information to large populations and have become increasingly 
accessible and affordable over the past decades. Technologies allow government and other 
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organizations to promote family planning and contraceptive initiatives to a broad populace at 
minimal cost. Brazil’s Ministry of Health maintains a website with detailed information on 
family planning, sexual education, contraceptives, and other health resources. USAID (2011) 
writes that mobile devices improve access to reproductive health information between both 
sexes. Further, they find that several African countries use SMS technology to send messages on 
family planning to female cellular phone users (USAID 2011). Television media has also 
affected fertility in Brazil. La Ferrara et al. (2008) finds that in regions covered by television 
networks that broadcast highly watched novelas  (soap operas) have significantly lower fertility, 
as they depict families as smaller than the average Brazilian family. The phenomenon of 
television entertainment affecting fertility might suggest that the government or other 
organizations could use this channel of communication to influence fertility or educate the 
populace about maternal health services. Technological penetration is expected to increase in 
Brazil and may continue to influence household fertility decisions. 
 Increased use and availability of contraceptive methods affect fertility throughout the 
country. The availability of oral contraceptive pills increased greatly during the 1970s, as they 
became available to purchase at pharmacies without a prescription. Both male (vasectomy) and 
female sterilization (tubal ligation) became increasingly prevalent during the 1980s and 1990s. 
The introduction of the Unified Health System in the new 1988 constitution provided free 
healthcare to all Brazilian citizens, allowing wider access to sterilization. Muniz (2006) finds that 
sterilization as a contraceptive method increased by 40 percent between 1986-96 and that 40.1 
percent of married women were sterilized by 1996. In 2007 Brazil further increased 
contraceptive access by passing measures to distribute free condoms and improve sexual health 
education in schools. The Ministry of Health expanded access in 2009, bringing the number of 
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free contraceptives available to eight, including oral pills, injectable birth control shots, and 
intrauterine devices. 
 Access to and societal beliefs about abortion provide yet another factor that affects 
fertility. In 1940 Brazil made abortion illegal except when the woman’s life was at risk or in 
cases of rape. Abortion remains illegal today and is difficult to measure, as women fear potential 
legal or social consequences for reporting it. One recent study that allowed anonymity found that 
over 20 percent of Brazilian women in urban areas had received an abortion by menopause 
(Ogland 2011). Given that abortion exists in Brazil, it is important to understand among which 
demographics it is most prevalent. Diniz et al. (2012) finds that high-income women have 
relatively more access to medically safe abortions at private facilities, but that low-income 
women generally attempt self-induced abortions and later seek care at public facilities after 
suffering from complications. We may expect a higher incidence of successful abortions among 
high-income women – the group that also exhibits a relatively lower TFR.  
Religious affiliation may also affect the TFR of women in Brazil with respect to abortion. 
The country has historical roots in the Roman Catholic Church and boasted membership of over 
90 percent until 1980. Membership in the Catholic Church has continually decreased since the 
1980 census. This decrease has been mirrored with an increase in Protestantism (especially 
Pentecostalism). Both the Catholic and Pentecostal Protestant churches believe that life begins at 
conception and strongly oppose abortion (Ogland 2011). Given this belief, females that identify 
as religious (especially as Catholic of Pentecostal) might exhibit relatively lower fertility rates 
than non-religious women. The North and Northeast regions, with higher incidences of Afro-
Brazilian and indigenous religions might show different TFRs than in regions with higher 
prevalence of Christian religions (LAPOP 2012). 
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Brazil has experienced a rapid decline in fertility over the past half century among all 
socio-demographic groups and regions. Several factors including urbanization and 
industrialization, increased education and access to contraceptives, and information and 
communication technologies all contribute to this phenomenon. With respect to Bolsa Família 
beneficiaries, who represent the country’s poorest citizens, it is important to identify the 
characteristics that affect fertility among this group. The literature suggests that geographic 
location may play a significant factor, particularly because of the large difference in fertility 
observed between the North/Northeast and the South/Southeast regions. Access to 
communication technologies and contraceptives is not evenly distributed, which may also 
contribute to this inter-regional fertility difference. Religious affiliation may explain fertility 
differences, as it influences personal beliefs on premarital childbearing and abortion. Literature 
has repeatedly found that household income levels also influence fertility. 
2.1 DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY AMONG THE POOR 
The previous section provided an overview of fertility trends in Brazil during the past half 
century and highlighted several factors that influenced the fertility among the entire population. 
This paper intends to find out the determinants of fertility among Bolsa Família beneficiaries in 
Brazil. This section reviews the literature on the factors that affect fertility among the poorest in 
the developing world, as this population is similar to the Bolsa Família population.  
Bongaarts (1978) provides a framework to analyze the determinants of fertility among the 
poor. He groups these factors into two groups – proximate determinants and socioeconomic 
variables. Proximate determinants have direct impact on fertility as they include the biological 
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and sociological factors that can affect fertility. These proximate determinants are influenced by 
the society in which an individual lives, as well as the society’s cultural, social, and economic 
beliefs. Bongaarts initially discussed eleven different variables that may affect fertility, deriving 
these factors from Davis and Blake (1956). However, he contended that four determinants were 
the most important – proportion married, contraceptive use, induced abortion, and postpartum 
infecundability – as they accounted for up to 96% of fertility trends in developing countries. 
Several empirical studies confirmed that the proximate determinants suggested by Bongaarts 
account for much of the change in fertility in developing countries (Chucks 2003, Casterline 
1994, Palamuleni 2010). With little doubt these proximate determinants are strongly influenced 
by societal and cultural beliefs such as religion. 
There is strong evidence that finds religiosity affects the fertility of the poor population in 
developing nations. Heaton (2011) uses data from Demographic and Health Surveys in 30 
developing countries and finds that individuals that identify with a particular religious affiliation 
(Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Islam in this study) are more likely to have higher fertility 
rates. The study contends that religion affects fertility by influencing two factors: marriage 
beliefs and contraceptive usage. Religious doctrines tend to encourage marriage at a relatively 
young age, when the woman is most fertile. Marriage and childbearing are considered central to 
most major religions, which promote large, strong families. Religious doctrines also tend to 
oppose the use of contraceptives and denounce abortion (two of the four top proximate 
determinants of fertility according to Bongaarts). 
As Bongaarts (1978) mentioned, other socioeconomic variables affect the fertility of 
women independent of proximate determinants. Basu (2002) finds a strong negative relationship 
between education and fertility among the poor. He contends that as women become more 
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educated their social status relative to society increases, offering them increased autonomy in 
decision-making processes such as childbearing. Educated women are also more likely to have 
been exposed to sexual education and family planning coursework in school.  
Employment status is another socioeconomic variable that affects the fertility of women. 
Several studies (Bernhardt 1991, Del Boca et al. 2003) contend that employed women produce 
fewer children than unemployed women, all else equal. One reason that employed woman are 
more likely to have fewer children is that the monetary benefits gained from wage earning 
activities raises the opportunity cost of childrearing (Becker 1964). Demographic literature has 
identified several additional socioeconomic indicators that affect fertility among the poor in the 
developing world, such as literacy, urbanization, and GNP per capita. The empirical data 
analysis presented in Section 4 & 5 of this paper will take into account the most relevant 
proximate and socioeconomic determinants of fertility (subject to availability of the data) in 
order to identify which variables are significant among the Bolsa Família population. The next 
section will provide a background on Becker’s theory of household fertility decisions to describe 
how families allocate income with respect to children. 
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2.2 ECONOMIC THEORY OF FERTILITY 
Becker’s (1960) seminal paper attempts to describe how households make fertility decisions 
given that parents have a preference for both the quantity and quality of their children. Becker 
argued that fertility preferences could be explained using a static model for which children 
represent a type of normal good and that the demand for such children has two components – a 
qualitative component that describes the amount and type of expenditures put toward a child, and 
a quantitative component, which represents the number of children a couple produces. In this 
static model, parents must chose between the quantity and quality of their children. The given 
utility function for a married couple is as follows: 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑛, 𝑞, 𝑠) … … … … … (1) 
Where n represents the number of children, q represents the quality of each child, and s 
represents the standard of living of the parental dyad.  
 The budget constraint of the couple is given as: 
𝐼 =  𝜋𝑐𝑛𝑞 + 𝜋𝑠𝑠… … … … … (2) 
Such that I represents the total family income, 𝜋𝑐 is the price of goods and services put toward 
children and 𝜋𝑠 is the price of goods and services used by the adults.  
 Becker (1960) also stresses that according to this model, certain income elasticities of 
demand must exist: 
𝛼�𝜀𝑛 + 𝜀𝑞� + (1 − 𝛼)𝜀𝑠 = 1 … … … … … … (3) 
 Such that 𝛼 represents the share of I spent on children, and (1 − 𝛼) represents the rest of 
the income spent on adults. The various value for 𝜀 signify the corresponding income elasticities 
of the number of children, quality, and parental standard of living. In this model Becker argues 
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that 𝜀𝑞 > 𝜀𝑛, meaning that given a rise in income, a family would be expected to invest more 
money in children’s quality relative to their quantity on the aggregate. 
 Becker and Lewis (1973) provide an expanded version of Becker (1960) by attempting to 
maximize the utility function 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑛, 𝑞, 𝑠) subject to the budget constraint. They then propose 
a new budget constraint that includes the cost of children not due to quality investments as well 
as the costs of quality that are unrelated to the number of children: 
𝐼 =  𝜋𝑛𝑛 + 𝜋𝑞𝑞 + 𝜋𝑐𝑛𝑞 + 𝜋𝑟𝑠… … … … … … . (4) 
 The consequences of the new model are numerous. In the Brazilian context, we may 
think of the increased availability of contraceptive methods in recent years. Contraceptives 
reduce the cost of becoming pregnant, which increases the marginal cost of each birth but have 
no effects on the marginal cost of child quality. Given this example, we expect that the rise in 
price of a child will reduce n, which favors the ratio q/n toward higher quality instead of 
quantity. Contraceptives affect 𝜋𝑛 and decrease the elasticity if demand for children. Similar 
arguments can be made about the elasticity of demand for q. For example, a poor school 
environment or bad neighborhood for raising a child would decrease 𝜋𝑞 (Hotz 1997). Becker and 
Lewis’s (1973) model also claims that the income elasticity of quality is greater than that of 
quantity. This means that when incomes rise, parents spend relatively more on quality over 
quantity, but that this larger rise in quality increases the shadow price of quantity, further 
dissuading parents from choosing quantity.  
Researchers have carried out several empirical studies over the years to test the validity 
of Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973) claims. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) examine 
Becker’s theory using data that measures education attainment of rural Indian farm households. 
They find that exogenous increases in fertility lead to a decrease in child fertility. They also 
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recommend that improvements in contraceptives, which affect 𝜋𝑛, equation (4) above, would 
help increase schooling levels among children. Hanushek (1992) finds further support to 
Becker’s claim, contending that family size significantly affects children’s education. He writes 
that first-born children have a definite advantage in quality (academically) because they have a 
higher probability of belonging to a small family. Li et al. (2008) study a dataset of children 
students in China and find evidence to support the quality-quantity tradeoff by noting that family 
size is negatively correlated with education attainment. 
This paper examines how fertility differs among low-income groups – especially 
participants in the Bolsa Família Program. Identification of the proximate determinants of 
fertility among this group proves extremely useful in a policy context. Policymakers could 
allocate resources to incentivize fertility change in groups possessing these factors. According to 
the Beckerian model outlined above, should policymakers alter household child quantity, they 
may also affect child quality. Policies designed to reduce quantity (and consequently increase 
quality) are in-line with the BFP’s plan, which seeks to raise long-term human capital. Another 
observation of the Beckerian model regards the income elasticity of demand, 𝜀𝑖. Given that 
𝜀𝑞 > 𝜀𝑛, equation (3) above, changes to income transfers or stipend amounts from the BFP have 
a larger effect on the quality of children than the quantity. When determining future BFP 
payment amounts they should recognize that payment increases theoretically raises human 
capital more than the number of children a family decides to produce.  
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2.3 CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND FERTILITY 
The discussion of income’s effects on household fertility is relevant when considering 
income transfer programs. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are one type of income 
transfer programs that may influence fertility decisions. CCTs generally provide a monthly cash 
stipend to a family according to the number of children in the household. That is, a family 
receives a marginal increase in their stipend for each additional marginal child. This has led to 
some criticism that CCT programs may increase the fertility rates of program participants, as 
they tend to reward large families. Here it is important to note that this section of the literature 
review is intended to give the reader a background on the Bolsa Família Program and fertility. 
Although this paper does not seek to study whether participation in the Program is a significant 
determinant in household fertility decisions, this section (as well as Section 3.0) provides a 
useful contextual framework in which the empirical portion of this study can be framed. 
CCT programs distribute money to program participants provided they fulfill specific 
conditions. Conditions generally attempt to increase the level of human capital among program 
participants. Examples include school attendance requirements or required immunizations and 
health checkups. Oftentimes those participating in CCT programs are among the country’s 
poorest groups and lack the ability to pay for education and healthcare services. As such, 
governments generally subsidize healthcare and education where CCTs exist. Schultz (1997) 
finds that this subsidization leads parents to invest relatively more in human capital of their 
children (quality) and decrease fertility (quantity). This finding is contrary to the previous 
finding, which predicts that CCT programs would increase fertility. We find similar ambiguity of 
how social welfare affects fertility using empirical examples. 
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Brewer et al. (2010) examine the introduction of the Working Families’ Tax Credit in the 
United Kingdom, which increased welfare benefits to households with children. The study finds 
that fertility does indeed respond to financial incentives, increasing the number of births by 
almost 15% for couples (though no significant increase among single women). Baughman and 
Dickert-Conlin (2009) find that increasing benefits of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 
United States leads to a very small decrease in fertility among program recipients. Moffit (1997) 
provides a detailed summary of fertility and welfare literature and finds that increased generosity 
of welfare benefits is usually associated with higher fertility. This effect is larger for white 
women relative to black women. Moffitt further stresses that these results are weakened because 
they are highly sensitive to the methodology employed in each study.  
 Authors have begun to study the effects of welfare benefits on fertility in the Latin 
American context in recent years. Stecklov et al. (2007) provides the most comprehensive study 
of how CCTs affect beneficiary fertility in Latin America. The authors study Mexico’s 
Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA), the Family Assistance Program 
(PRAF) in Honduras, and the Social Protection Network (RPS) in Nicaragua. The study employs 
randomly assigned treatment and control groups in order to generate panel data. It found that 
Mexico’s PROGRESA has almost no effect on fertility. Schultz (2001) finds similar results, 
indicating no statistically significant effect on fertility. Todd and Wolpin (2006) construct a 
model relating PROGRESA’s effects on fertility and schooling and estimate that the program 
would have little effect on fertility. 
Stecklov et al. found that in the Nicaraguan case, the RPS had a very small positive effect 
on fertility rates, but that this statistic was not significant. In a separate study, Todd et al. (2012) 
examine the RPS’s effects on birth spacing among program participants. They conclude that the 
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Program increases birth spacing, which decreases fertility (contrary to findings on the same 
program in Stecklov 2007). Interestingly, Stecklov finds that Honduras’s PRAF has a strong 
positive effect on childbearing, leading to a 2-4 percentage increase in the probability of birth 
among beneficiaries. 
Empirical data of how CCT programs in Latin America affect fertility appear to lack 
consistency. Stecklov et al. (2007) provides one explanation as to why PROGRESA and RPS 
showed no increase in fertility while the PRAF did lead to an increase. During the two years 
included in the panel data parents in Mexico and Nicaragua were unable to enroll in 
PROGRESA or RPS after the program had commenced. Participants of the two programs 
received a lump sum benefit regardless of whether they produced more children. In contrast, 
Honduras’s PRAF allowed new parents to enroll in the program if they became eligible by 
bearing a child. The PRAF’s benefit also increased a marginal amount per each child. One may 
attribute the different results observed by the PRAF to the financial incentives it provided to 
produce more children. This study suggests that program design plays an important role in 
determining whether unintended consequences may occur given a certain policy (Fiszbein and 
Schady 2009). In the next section this study will outline Brazil’s CCT program, the Bolsa 
Família, and review similar literature on whether program participation affects fertility. Then, 
empirically will transition to the determinants of fertility among BFP participants  
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3.0  BRAZIL AND THE BOLSA FAMÍLIA 
Conditional cash transfer programs in Brazil began in 1996 with the introduction of the Child 
Labor Eradication Program (PETI). PETI provided participants a cash stipend on the condition 
that their children achieved at least 80 percent attendance and attended an after school program 
that significantly lengthened the amount of time the child spent at school. The Program intended 
to reduce the labor supply generated by children while raising human capital among participants 
simultaneously (Yoon et al. 2001). PETI’s success led to the development of the Bolsa Escola 
program, which expanded coverage and raised the monthly stipend that beneficiaries received. 
Both PETI and the Bolsa Escola required children to regularly attend school and each had a 
minimum and maximum age (7-15 and 6-15 respectively). As such, it is unlikely a family would 
have increased fertility in response to these programs, as they would have to wait between six 
and seven years to receive benefits. 
In 2001 policymakers introduced the Bolsa Alimentação, a conditional cash transfer 
program that aimed to reduce infant mortality and increase nutrition among Brazil’s poorest 
citizens. The eligibility window for this program was significantly different from the PETI and 
Bolsa Escola, ranging from six months to six years of age. Consequently, households no longer 
had to wait six years to receive increased benefits per marginal child – they only had to wait six 
months. Although Bolsa Alimentação’s reduced waiting period may have provided greater 
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financial incentives relative to PETI and Bolsa Escola, Rocha (2009) writes that it was unlikely 
to significantly raise fertility rates. 
Brazil soon introduced several other federal social programs including Auxilo Gas and 
the Programa Cartão Alimentação, which provided gas and food subsidies respectively. Given 
that each program had its own financing schedules, eligibility requirements, and administering 
agencies, the operation of social programs was bureaucratic and inefficient. In 2003 under the 
direction of newly elected president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) Brazil introduced the Bolsa 
Família Program (BFP), seeking to consolidate social programs and improve efficiency. The 
BFP would also better target potential participants, encourage the joint promotion of health and 
education in youth, and strengthen the oversight and evaluation processes (Lindert et al. 2007). 
In December 2003 – two months after its introduction – the BFP served 3.8 million families. 
Over the past decade, the program has grown exponentially, now serving more than 13 million 
families or over 50 million Brazilians.  
The BFP’s approach to social assistance is two-pronged. Firstly, the BFP provides 
families with a small cash stipend in order to reduce immediate short-term poverty. Recipients 
receive a stipend between R$32 (US$16.2) to R$306 (US$155) per month, depending on the 
number of children in the family. Secondly, the BFP seeks to interrupt the persistence of 
intergenerational poverty. The BFP’s conditions stipulate that children maintain at least 85 
percent school attendance and that they receive regular vaccinations and health checkups. Over 
time, the BFP seeks to foster a healthier and better-educated society, which may result in 
relatively higher long-run economic growth. 
The BFP is the largest CCT program of its kind in the world. As such, it has generated a 
multitude of literature that examines its effectiveness. One study finds that the BFP increased 
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school enrollment rates by 5.5% in grades 1-4, and 6.5% in grades 5-8. The report also finds that 
the BFP decreased dropout rates and increased scholastic performance throughout Brazil 
(Glewwe and Kassouf 2008). Neto (2010) reinforces these findings, writing that the BFP 
increased enrollment over 2%. The BFP also sought to increase health related indicators of youth 
by requiring children to attend regular checkups and acquire immunizations. Soares (2010) wrote 
that the BFP “had no impact on child immunizations” and that it had little impact on child 
nutrition. Impacts in Andrade et. al (2007) are similar, with no significant evidence that the BFP 
helped improve height, weight, and body mass index among program participants. The literature 
suggests that the BFP has helped boost education indicators but has had less effect on health 
indicators – two areas policymakers anticipated would improve.  
Additional intended impacts of the BFP include poverty reduction and decreased income 
inequality. Soares (2006) found “that the Gini index fell by 4.7 percent from 1995 to 2004 and 
that the Bolsa Família was responsible for 21 percent of that fall” (Soares 2010). On the topic of 
poverty, Zepeda (2006) finds that the BFP reduced poverty by 12%. Soares and Sátyro (2010) 
also write that the BFP has significantly reduced the poverty gap among Brazilians. 
Policymakers have thus realized the intended effects of the BFP with respect to poverty and 
inequality according to reports using short-term data. 
The majority of the BFP’s evaluations concern its effectiveness with respect to its 
intended consequences, including health, education, poverty, and inequality statistics. A 
relatively unexplored field attempts to uncover some of the BFP’s unintended consequences on 
statistics such as fertility. This paper will first examine some of these unintended consequences 
with respect to fertility, and then move on to discuss how fertility trends differ among BFP 
beneficiaries in general. 
 23 
To examine whether the BFP affects participant fertility, we must first analyze the 
Program’s structure. The BFP categorizes recipients into two categories: poor and extremely 
poor. Extremely poor families are those which earn less than R$70 per person. They receive a 
base payment of R$70 per month regardless of how many children are in the family. Because 
this amount is fixed, it should not theoretically have any effect on fertility decisions. Poor 
families are those with a monthly income between R$70-140 per person. These families do not 
receive a base payment.  
The BFP also provides beneficiaries stipend related to the amount of dependent children 
exist in a given family. For each marginal child until the limit of five, a BFP beneficiary receives 
an additional R$32 per month. This amount is the same regardless of whether the family is 
categorized as poor or extremely poor. This additional per-child monthly stipend could 
incentivize parents to have one or more additional children. As the BFP is the primary source of 
income for some Brazilian households, it is possible that some families attempt to maximize 
household earnings by producing more children. Further, if we consider children normal goods 
(Becker 1960, 1973) then an increase in income would also increase fertility. Since the income 
elasticity of demand for quality is higher than quantity, increased income would promote quality 
to an even greater extent. 
It should be noted that Brazilian policymakers foresaw that the BFP might encourage 
child production. Initially, BFP beneficiaries could only receive a marginal increase in monthly 
payment until the third child. This limit eventually rose to five in order to expand the Program to 
larger families, but in no way motivates unlimited child production due to financial benefits. 
Moreover, the BFP’s design only allows families to receive stipends for two teens ages 16 to 17 
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(Variable Benefit Linked to Teen, BVJ), and once a child reaches 18 years of age, his or her 
stipend is discontinued. 
As a result, if households anticipate that a child will ‘age out’ of the Program, they may 
be encouraged to produce an additional child to continue receiving the monthly stipend. It should 
be noted that expectations of BFP’s continuation plays an important factor in determining the 
household supply and demand for children. If program participants believe that the Program will 
discontinue in the near future, we expect they would be less likely to produce additional children, 
as the marginal cost of each additional child will greatly exceed the marginal benefit afforded by 
the BFP. Conversely, if program participants expect that the BFP will continue in the long term, 
they may be more inclined to produce a child with the intention of receiving cash stipends for a 
considerable amount of time. 
Authors have published three papers on the topic of the BFP’s effects on fertility in 
recent years. Rocha (2009) uses bi-yearly data from Brazil’s National Household Sample Survey 
(PNAD) between the years 1995-2007 in conjunction with the 2006 PNAD supplement, which 
included specific questions about the BFP. This study employs three methodological approaches. 
Firstly is a difference in differences method, which considers a treatment and control group 
created using PNAD’s fertility and income data. The second uses the 2006 PNAD supplement 
and attempts to discover whether beneficiaries are likely to increase fertility under the condition 
that they may receive additional money for more children (up to a limit of three). Lastly, looks at 
the effect of treatment on the treated (beneficiaries) using Propensity Score Matching. Rocha 
concluded that the BFP decreased fertility among program beneficiaries, but that this statistic 
was not significant for any of the three methodologies.  
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Signorini and Queiroz (2011) use Bolsa Família data included in the PNAD’s 
supplemental survey in 2004 and 2006. Because the PNAD survey in 2004 and 2006 is not panel 
data and did not survey the same households, Signorini and Queiroz use a Propensity Score 
Matching method to create analogous treatment and control groups. They reduced the sample to 
only include women of reproductive age (15-50 years) that had a monthly income eligible for 
participation. After matching the 2004 and 2006 groups they calculate the average treatment 
effect on the treated for each group and compare the difference. They find that in 2004, the 
probability of having a child in the last year was 6.3 percent for the treated group relative to the 
control group. In 2006, they calculated this statistic to be -5.6 percent, resulting in a positive .7 
percent increase between the two years using a difference-in-difference approach. However, 
Signorini and Queiroz conclude that this small positive impact was not statistically significant, 
and thus the BFP has no effect on the fertility of program participants. 
Most recently, Simões and Soares (2012) used the 2006 National Demographic and 
Health Survey (PNDS), which includes women’s health, fertility, and demographic statistics. 
The PNDS is particularly useful because it allows the researchers to control for covariates. They 
use two models to evaluate the BFP’s effects on fertility – a two-stage Heckman model and a 
Generalized Method of Moments method. The study concludes that BFP beneficiaries had lower 
fertility rates than non-beneficiaries with statistical significance. They also note that this effect 
was more pronounced among lower income groups. These conclusions are different than those 
provided by Rocha (2009) and Signorini and Queiroz (2011), which found that, the BFP had no 
significant effects on fertility of participants. Simões and Soares write that the difference in 
results may stem from the different methodologies used among the studies. They observe that a 
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similar situation occurred with the case of Nicaragua’s RPS, where Stecklov et. al (2007) find no 
statistical significance of a CCT on fertility, but Todd et. al (2011) do.  
This study does not build off of the previous ones discussed, as it does not examine how 
the BFP affects the fertility of beneficiaries. The previous literature review attempts to provide a 
succinct background on BFP fertility literature. This study seeks to identify trends and 
discrepancies in fertility rates among different socio-demographic groups given that a family 
participates in the Program. It employs data from Brazil’s 2011 PNAD survey and uses a 
multiple linear regression methodology. I anticipate that this paper will contribute to the 
literature by providing a relatively holistic picture of fertility rates among BFP beneficiaries and 
identify variables that policymakers may utilize to alter fertility rates according to the identified 
sub-groups. Should policymakers motivate BFP participants to change their fertility (quantity), 
then according to the Beckerian model, it may be possible to alter the child quality (human 
capital) too. 
 
3.1 BOLSA FAMÍLIA IDENTIFICATION 
The most significant limitation of the data is that it does not include a question that asked 
whether a household participated in the Bolsa Família Program nor did it ask the amount of 
money a household receives from conditional cash transfer programs. Despite these limitations, I 
use this data because it is representative of the entire Brazilian population and includes a specific 
section on maternity and fertility, which other surveys lack. Moreover, the majority of the 
literature that investigates the relationship between fertility and the BFP use PNAD data. 
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Because the purpose of this paper is to look at how fertility rates differ among beneficiaries, I 
seek to identify BFP participants using other variables in the data set. Higgins (2012) notes that 
the PNAD survey includes eight variables for non-labor income. One of these variables is 
labeled “Other Income”, which is described as financial income such as dividends and interest 
from savings and dividend and from government social programs (such as the Bolsa Família).  
To identify households that received transfers from the BFP I begin by identifying all 
households that reported an “Other Income” that corresponds to one of the possible combinations 
of BFP payments listed in Table. Next, I limit the study only to households eligible to participate 
in the BFP – households with at least one child between ages 5 and 17 and earning a per capita 
familial income of less than R$140 per month. Families earnings between zero and R$70 per 
person receive a basic transfer of R$70 (unconditional transfer), R$32 per child between ages 5 
and 15 (up to five), and R$38 per child between ages 16 to 17 (up to two), provided they fulfill 
the Program conditions. Families earning between R$70 and R$140 per person do not receive a 
basic transfer, but do receive R$32 per child between ages 5 and 15 (up to five), and R$38 per 
child between ages 16 to 17 (up to two), provided the BFP’s education and health conditions are 
met. Unfortunately the PNAD survey does not provide specific data on each individual child’s 
health and education statuses. As such, this model assumes that children of each BFP participant 
family completes the necessary human capital requirements 
Higgins (2012) refers to a methodology employed by Barros et al. (2007), in which the 
researchers attempted to separate CCT programs out of the 2005 PNAD data given that there 
were no specific survey questions about the transfers. In 2005 Brazil had already implemented 
the BFP but was also phasing out several other CCT programs. In order to separate government 
social program transfers from other income Barros et al. calculate all possible combinations of 
 28 
transfer payments that could stem from CCT programs like the BFP and only analyze households 
that receive payments matching one of the amounts. This methodology is applicable to the 2011 
PNAD and requires a calculation of all possible combinations of payments under the BFP. These 
values are listed in the BFP Payment Schedule Table in the appendix. The graph below shows 
the distribution of income stemming from the “Other Income” category. Note that the large 
spikes correspond with the exact values of Bolsa Família transfers. 
  
Figure 7. Distribution of Other Income 
As Higgins (2012) notes, families that participate in Bolsa Família and incorrectly report 
their monthly non-labor income, or those families that rounded up to the nearest R$10 would be 
excluded from this analysis because they would no longer report an exact BFP transfer amount. 
Further, Bolsa Família beneficiaries that do receive interest or dividends on financial investments 
and report this amount alongside their cash transfer would be excluded. This analysis assumes 
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that BFP beneficiaries do not receive (or do not report) other income stemming from financial 
investments, as the extremely poor are usually excluded from these markets.  
All models include restrictions to analyze only BFP beneficiaries, as suggested by Barros 
et al. (2007) and Higgins (2012). In accordance with the BFP’s eligibility criteria, only 
households with a familial per capita income below R$140 per month are included. Additionally, 
families are required to have more than one child, and this child must be eligible to attend school 
(between the ages of 5 and 17). Lastly, respondents must have reported receiving “Other 
Income” corresponding to an exact amount of one of the 24 stipend possibilities. 
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4.0  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study of fertility among the Bolsa Família population in Brazil utilizes data from the 2011 
Household Sample National Survey (PNAD). The PNAD nationally representative survey 
administered by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IGBE) on a bi-yearly basis 
(except during Census years). Much like a census, the PNAD collects information on educational 
attainment, the labor market, housing conditions, fertility, and income. The 2011 PNAD includes 
observations from 358,919 households.  
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics of both the BF participants sample and the 
larger sample. (those who may or may not benefit from the BFP). The restricted sample includes 
1,746 households and the large sample includes 36,608 households. The original sample includes 
higher number of observations because this study is restricted to those who provided responses to 
all questions. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Source: Author’s own calculations. PNAD, 2011 
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The descriptive statistics shown in Table (1) highlight characteristics of Bolsa Família 
beneficiaries relative to the overall sample. BFP participants, on average, have one more child, 
are 5 years younger, have three years less schooling, and have less income relative to the sample. 
42% of BFP beneficiaries reside in rural areas compared to only 11.7% of the larger sample. 
They are also significantly technologically disadvantaged – only 12.3% have accessed the 
Internet in the three months prior to the survey compared to 50.6% of the sample. 58% of BFP 
participants owned a cell phone at the time of the survey, while 84.5% of the sample owned one. 
From a racial perspective, BFP participants are more likely to be brown relative to the 
broader population (64.4% vs. 44.3%) and less likely to be white (25.2% vs. 42.8%). They are 
more likely to reside in the North (22.3% vs. 15.1%) and Northeast (55.8% vs. 26.9%) compared 
to the larger sample. BFP beneficiaries are less represented in the South relative to the sample 
(6% vs. 14.9%) and the Southeast (12.2% vs. 28.8%).  
From a family type perspective, BFP beneficiaries are much more likely to be single 
mothers compared to the population (39.7% vs. 24.6%). They are also more likely to be single 
with respect to marital status (59.6% vs. 41.6%). Lastly, BFP beneficiaries are more likely to 
identify their marriages as religious (6.4% vs. 2.8%) and less likely to identify it as civil or civil 
and religious. Now that I have given a brief overview of the samples to be analyzed, I will 
discuss the model that uses this data. 
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4.1 THE MODEL 
In order to assess how various explanatory variables affect household fertility decisions among 
Bolsa Família Program beneficiaries in Brazil this paper employs a multiple linear regression 
model.  
Given the data set �𝑦𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝�𝑖=1𝑛 , a multiple linear regression model relates the dependent 
variable 𝑦𝑖 to 𝑝 vectors of 𝑥𝑖 in a linear manner.  
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯+  𝐵𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝 such that 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛…….(5) 
Where 𝑦𝑖 represents the number of children that a given respondent reported giving birth 
to, 𝛼 denotes the control variable, 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of covariates (age in years, years of education, 
urban or rural location, employment status, hours worked at job per week, logarithm of total 
household income, family composition, race, marital status, region, marriage type, access to the 
Internet, and cell phone ownership), and 𝛽𝑝 is the parameter vector that corresponds to the 
various explanatory variables previously mentioned. 
 This paper will analyze the parameter vectors, 𝐵𝑝, to determine the most significant 
variables that affect fertility among BF beneficiaries. 
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 Table 2. Explanatory Variables and Definitions 
Source: PNAD, 2011 
4.2 PREDICTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Table 2 provides a list of the explanatory variables used in the multiple linear regression 
model, as well as their definitions and how the dummy variables were coded.  
As this paper studies fertility among the Bolsa Família population, the dependent variable 
is the number of children that a respondent reported producing. The PNAD did not include a 
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specific variable for the number of children; instead, it asked mothers to report the number of 
boys and the number of girls they gave birth to. The dependent variable is the total number of 
boys and girls per mother. 
Age is a significant factor in determining the number of children a woman will produce 
because women are most fertile at young ages and become increasingly infertile at older ages. It 
is reasonable to predict that age will have a negative relationship with fertility. The literature 
(Martin and Juarez 1995, Basu 2002) suggests that education leads to lower fertility rates and 
that this relationship is especially strong among women. The PNAD survey considered age a 
continuous variable, but this study partitions age into dummy variables for every five years. 
Further, this study imposes a lower limit of age at 11 years and an upper limit at 50 years. The 
youngest case of a women giving birth in the data set is 13 years old, which is included in the 11-
15 year old dummy. An upper limit of 50 is consistent with the literature. Salihu et al. (2003) 
find that pregnancy beyond the age of 50 years is highly uncommon without the use of in-vitro 
fertilization and is extremely risky to the fetus. It is unlikely that BFP participants have access to 
private health care facilities or would be able to pay for in-vitro fertilization, further decreasing 
the likelihood that a woman over 50 could produce a child. 
Education allows women to become formally introduced to contraceptives and family 
planning programs as part of classroom curriculums. It increases the social status of women and 
increases gender equality, providing them greater autonomy in decision-making processes 
regarding fertility. Finally, educational attainment gives women an increased choice of wage-
earning opportunities, which raises the opportunity cost of childbearing, decreasing fertility. 
It is likely that urban women will produce fewer children than rural women, all else 
constant. The net benefits to having more children are higher to parents in rural areas relative to 
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urban areas. In rural areas, children often help with farming activities at early ages and continue 
to work for the family as they grow older. The net benefits of large families are substantially 
lower in urban areas, where children are less likely to work at young age and the marginal cost of 
raising a child is relatively higher. The statistics from IGBE census data in Brazil provided in 
section (2) of this paper also support the hypothesis of relatively lower fertility rates in urban 
areas. 
Employment status will likely influence the fertility decisions of Brazilian women. 
Employment increases a woman’s wage-earning potential, which raises her opportunity cost of 
spending time raising children. As the opportunity cost of childbearing increases, she is expected 
to produce fewer children. In addition to whether a woman is employed, the number of hours 
worked may also affect fertility decisions. Under the assumption that there exists a tradeoff 
between the number of hours a woman may spend raising her child and working, then it is 
plausible that a higher number of hours worked per week will decrease fertility preferences. The 
literature is mixed on how income affects fertility. Myrskylä (2009) finds a J-shaped trend, while 
Furuoka (2009) contends that high development and income is strictly associated with lower 
fertility. According the Beckerian framework, one would expect that higher income is associated 
with higher fertility (quantity), as children exhibit a positive income elasticity of demand. 
rRegion may act as a determinant of fertility among the BFP population. The PNAD did 
not include a question that asked for the respondent’s region, but instead asked for the state. I 
used a map from the IGBE website to group all of the states into their respective regions and 
generated a new variable for each region. Despite the high variation in fertility rates across 
different regions in the entire population, the sample of BFP beneficiaries studied here do not 
exhibit the same trends. Among the study sample the average low fertility rate is in the Northeast 
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(2.45) and the high is in the North (2.91). As such, I do not predict significant regional 
differences.  
Fertility varies widely among different racial groups in Brazil and may act as a potential 
significant determinant. In the general population, the respondents that identify as white have the 
lowest average fertility rates, while the indigenous group has the highest. This trend holds for the 
group of BFP participants in 2011, where whites produced 2.36 children on average and 
indigenous produced 3.46. However, the variation between the other races is much smaller, as 
brown respondents produced 2.68 children, blacks 2.65 children, and yellow 2.57 children. 
Among the BFP beneficiaries the indigenous group appears an outlier relative to the other racial 
categories. This study predicts that race may not prove significant in fertility determination with 
the exception of the indigenous group 
Region and race are highly related in Brazil. Indigenous and black groups have a larger 
presence in the North and Northeast regions of the country while white, yellow, and brown are 
more commonly found in the South and Southeast. However, among the BFP population in this 
study the distribution of race among region is quite different, as illustrated in Table 4 below. 
  
Table 3. Distribution of Race and Region for BFP beneficiaries 
Source: author’s own calculations. PNAD, 2011 
 38 
Table 4 gives the distribution of race for each region in percentage terms. It shows that 
across all races, most BFP beneficiaries live in either the North or Northeastern regions. The 
majority of white, brown, black, and yellow reside in the Northeast, and the majority of 
indigenous live in the North. Few BFP participants live in the South or Southeast, although this 
rate is higher for white and black. This distribution is quite different than the one described 
earlier, in which white and yellow dominated the South while black and indigenous were more 
prevalent in the Northern regions. In order to gain a fuller understanding of how region and race 
influence fertility, this paper will include interaction variables in the empirical model. Table 3 
lists the interaction variables and their respective definitions.  
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Table 4. Interaction Variables Used In Regression Models 
 
Family type could have a measureable effect on household fertility decisions. The 2011 
PNAD survey asked households to report whether the family was a single mother (above and 
below age 14), couple with or without a child (above and below age 14), or another type of 
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family. For this study the “above and below age 14” groups are combined. Further, the couple 
without a child variable does not appear in the regression because the BFP stipulates that a 
family must have at least one child of schooling age. Given that Other Type is the reference 
group, this paper anticipates that Couple w/ Child will have a positive and significant coefficient 
because two individuals in a family are able to share the costs of childrearing. Couples also allow 
one partner to engage in wage-earning activities while the other individual cares for the child. 
Single mothers face a tradeoff between working and taking care of a child in terms of hours 
spent and wage-earning potential that is forgone. This paper hypothesizes that single mothers 
will not exhibit positive or significant coefficients. Along a similar vein, marital status may 
affect fertility. Single parents face higher marginal costs per child and higher opportunity costs 
for taking care of children. Conversely, married parents share the marginal cost of a child and 
have lower child-working tradeoffs. Presumably, separated, divorced, and widowed respondents 
would have faced situations similar to married respondents at sometime in their life. As such, 
this paper hypothesizes that respondents that reported being married or previously married are 
relatively homogeneous with respect to fertility. However, the variable Single is predicted to 
have a significant and positive coefficient relative to the base group, widow. 
 Religiosity and religious affiliation may influence fertility decisions among BFP 
participants. The literature review in section 2 finds that poor, religious households in developing 
nations are likely to have higher fertility rates than non-religious households, all else constant. 
This is due to relatively early age of marriage, lower use of contraceptives, and emphasis on the 
family. The descriptive statistics show that BFP beneficiaries are more likely to identify as 
religious than the general population. Given this information, this study predicts that religious 
couples will exhibit positive and significant fertility relative to the reference group. 
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Apart from the traditional determinants of fertility, access to technology might play a 
significant role in contemporary household decisions. BFP participants are less educated, less 
likely to have private health care, and less able to afford contraceptives relative to the general 
population. The BFP beneficiaries that own a cell phone or have access to the Internet have 
relatively more exposure to maternal and sexual health and family planning initiatives put forth 
by the Brazilian Ministry of Health and NGOs compared to beneficiaries that lack access. This 
study expects that access to technology will have a significant and negative effect on the fertility 
of BFP beneficiaries. Further, because of differences in cell phone and Internet usage between 
the young and elderly (the younger generation have a higher propensity to use technologies), this 
study again benefits by segmenting the continuous variable, age, into five-year dummy variables.  
This section attempts to provide the reader insight regarding the data and methodology 
employed in this paper before presenting the findings. A brief description of the descriptive 
statistics highlights the differences between the population of BFP beneficiaries and the Brazilian 
population in general. An overview of the Multiple Linear Regression model and thorough 
descriptions of the explanatory variables allow for reproducibility of this study. Lastly, this 
section provides hypotheses to how the covariates are expected to affect fertility when applied in 
the model. The next section discusses the findings of the regression models as well as the policy 
implications that can be drawn from the results.   
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5.0  FINDINGS 
An understanding of the determinants of fertility among Bolsa Família beneficiaries offers 
policymakers greater understanding of how poor households make fertility decision and how 
they may influence such factors. Should policymakers desire to direct resources to affect 
significant determinants, they may also affect the quantity of children a family produces. 
Applying Becker’s theory of the quantity-quality tradeoff, then identification of variables that 
affect quantity will allow policymakers to also influence child quality. This section presents the 
results of the Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) model presented in Section 4. Table 5 includes 
two MLR models. The first is the (MLR) with all of the explanatory variables as outlined in 
Section 4. The second is an MLR that includes the same explanatory variables as the first model, 
but also considers interaction terms between region and race highlighted in Section 4. It should 
be noted that variables are weighted using the statistic Peso da Pessoa, included in the 2011 
PNAD.  
For further reading, Table 7 in the Appendix provides alternate versions of the models 
included below. Models (1) and (4) do not include religion or technology. Models (2) and (5) do 
not include regional variables. Models (3) and (6) are the same as models in Table 5 below. All 
models focus on the determinants of fertility among the BFP population and those including 
interaction variables are denoted as such. 
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 Table 5. Multiple Linear Regression Models (3 & 6)1 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
                                                 
1 Only significant interaction variables are reported in this table. A complete table of 
interaction variables is available in the appendix. 
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 Both models find that additional years of education significantly reduces the number of 
children, though at a very small magnitude. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis given 
in Section 4, because education increases the social status and equality with men, offering 
women greater autonomy and influence in household decisions such as the decision to have a 
child. Further, educated women are more likely to be exposed to  school curriculum that includes 
sexual education and family planning guides. Despite education proving significant, the 
coefficients are extremely small (-.0514 and -.0500) for the two models. As such, each year does 
of education does reduce the quantity of children a women will produce, but only to a very small 
extent. 
 As predicted earlier, there exists a significant negative relationship between employment 
and fertility among BFP beneficiaries in both models. One explanation for this is that wage-
earning potential raises the opportunity cost of having a child and thus reduces fertility. The 
employment coefficient is relatively large – employed women have on average -.546 and  -.537 
children compared to non employed women in the model without interactions compared to the 
model with interactions, respectively. However, the number of working hours was insignificant, 
indicating that the tradeoff between hours spent on childrearing and hours spent in wage-earning 
activities might not be very strong. Related to employment is the variable Log Income, which is 
positive and significant in both models. As income increases, a female is more likely to have 
additional children. This finding supports the Beckarian model, which predicts that fertility 
increases when income rises because the income elasticity of demand for the quantity of 
children, 𝜀𝑛 is positive. Given that the income elasticity of demand for quality, 𝜀𝑞 is greater than 
𝜀𝑛, then income increase may result in relatively high improvements in child quality. 
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 The variable Urban can be considered a determinant of fertility among BFP beneficiaries, 
as it is significant and negative in both models. Consistent with this paper’s predictions, urban 
families are expected to have between .212 to .217 fewer children on average, all else equal. 
Such trends are reflected in the literature, which finds that rural families have higher fertility 
because the net benefit for each marginal child is higher than that for urban families, particularly 
for poor families. Of the five geographic regions, none came significant in either model. 
Although the regions exhibit significantly different fertility patterns in the overall sample, they 
do not prove significant among the group of BFP beneficiaries. 
 The race variable uses White as a reference group, as it is associated with the lowest 
fertility rate. As such, Section 4 predicted that all other races would have positive coefficients 
relative to the reference. The first model shows Black, Brown, and Indigenous as significant with 
positive coefficients:.444, .166, and .906 respectively. Although the first model in Table (5)’s 
output is similar to the predictions provided in Section 4, second model’s findings are quite 
different. In model 6 the group Yellow is the only significant variable, and the sign is negative 
relative to the reference group. The difference between the two models is that model 6 includes 
interaction variables between race and region as potential determinants of fertility. An interaction 
term between region and race captures the effect of region on fertility. This emphasizes the fact 
that race and region are related in Brazil, among the group of BFP beneficiaries.  
 Section 4 predicted that couples would have more children than single parents, as couples 
are able to share the upbringing cost of children, making each marginal child relatively cheaper 
for each individual. The Couple with Child variable proves very significant and positive for both 
models, with 1.14 children more than the reference group on average. However, such predictions 
did not hold with respect to marital status. Not one variable that designated marital status proved 
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significant. As such, these variables, according to this model, are not significant determinants of  
fertility among the BFP participants. Measures of religiosity produce like results. Although this 
paper predicted that religious affiliation would prove a significant explanatory variable in 
fertility determination, the analysis finds that none of the four categories are significant. This 
finding is surprising, because in the larger sample, religious couples tend to have more children 
on average than non-religious couples. 
Lastly, this study analyzes whether access to technology affects fertility decisions. 
Access to Internet and cell phone are significant and negative in the first model, implying that 
technological access may decrease fertility among the BFP population. Such an outcome was 
predicted in Section 4, as Brazil’s Ministry of Health initiatives have promoted family planning, 
reproductive education, and contraceptive availability through online and social media channels. 
Nonetheless, the second model includes interaction variables between age and technology. 
Inclusion of the interaction variables renders Cell Phone and Internet insignificant. However, in 
Table (8), interaction variables Techage2XInternet, Techage1XCell, and Techage2XCell are 
significant. As such, even though Internet or Cell Phone are not significant variables by 
themselves, when age is also a factor, they become significant. Techage1 captures respondents 
between age 11 and 25 and Techage2 corresponds to respondents between age 26 and 40. As 
such, fertility decreases significantly among women ages 26 to 40 that have Internet access. 
Further, cell phone ownership is a significant factor in reducing fertility among women between 
age 11 and 40. 
Much of the current literature focuses on the demographic transition and the proximate 
determinants of fertility among entire populations. This study limits its scope on a smaller scale 
by analyzing strictly participants in the Bolsa Família Program. Using a Multiple Linear 
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Regression model, this paper tests several explanatory variables that may influence fertility 
among this group, including age, education, employment status, income, infant mortality, urban 
or rural location, race, family type, and access to technology. Identification of these variables is 
necessary for policymakers when they consider the demographic composition of BFP recipients 
and how they respond when these variables change. Policymakers may influence fertility rates 
among BFP beneficiaries by focusing resources to affect these particular variables. The next 
section discusses the policy implications of these findings in greater detail and concludes with 
recommendations for future research. 
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6.0  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of fertility among participants in 
Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program. Previously, much of the literature attempted to determine the 
proximate determinants of fertility in developing countries. This study tests several of the 
previously identified variables in the literature including education, income, employment, age, 
infant mortality and whether an individual lives in an urban or rural setting. Contrary to previous 
findings of the literature, this study found that marital status and religiosity are not significant in 
influencing household fertility decisions among BFP participants. However, this paper identified 
several variables that significantly influenced fertility among female BFP beneficiaries. These 
variables include age, education, employment status, income, infant mortality rate, whether a 
respondent lived in an urban or rural area, and Internet access and cell phone ownership among 
certain age groups.  
The statistical analysis of the 2011 PNAD survey included in this paper allows 
policymakers to better understand how fertility varies among different socio-demographic groups 
that participate in the BFP.  
For example, one significant determinate of fertility among the BFP population is 
employment. If a woman is employed, she is likely to produce fewer children than an equivalent 
woman that is unemployed or out of the labor force. If policymakers were to enact legislations or 
policies in favor of lower rates of fertility among women enrolled in the BFP, then employment 
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policies would best achieve this goal. Under Becker’s theory, decreased fertility (quantity) would 
be met with increased human capital (quality) for her existing children. Given that the BFP 
intends to raise long-term human capital, policy that reduces fertility through one of the 
significant variables found in this study will indirectly increase child quality and help the 
Program achieve its goals. One example is access to technology. As section 5 discussed, cell 
phone ownership and access to the Internet is a significant factor among age 11 to 40 and age 26 
to 40, respectively. If policymakers were to increase access of these technologies among BFP 
beneficiaries that belong to these age groups using subsidies, they may observe a decrease in 
fertility among this group. Such a decrease in the quantity of children due to technology could 
lead these parents to invest relatively more in their child’s quality. 
It is important to remember the results found in this paper only apply to the population of 
BFP beneficiaries in Brazil. Despite the recent popularity of CCT programs in the developing 
world, this study lacks external validity. As such, a topic for future research would be to examine 
the variables that affect fertility among CCT participants in other country contexts. Such research 
would allow scholars to draw broader implications on fertility in the developing world. Future 
research should also consider using a data from a survey that has an explicit question about the 
Bosla Família Program, rather than generating a best estimate. Moreover, the 2011 PNAD did 
not include detailed information about the children that benefited from the BFP, nor their 
education level or health status. The data only identified whether a child was male or female and 
resided within a student’s age range (ages 5 to 17). further research could strengthen and build 
upon this paper’s results. it would allow researchers to draw even stronger conclusions about 
fertility decisions. As a note, the 2004 and 2006 PNAD surveys included a supplement on CCT 
programs in Brazil, but no subsequent PNAD surveys have. 
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A significant limitation of this study is the fact that PNAD provides only cross sectional 
data. Fertility is a dynamic process that takes place over time. Further, BFP beneficiaries 
sometimes drop out and reenroll in the Program. Panel data would allow researchers to identify 
common characteristics of households that exhibit certain traits over time (such as dis- and re-
enrollment) and track the life cycle determinants of fertility of the BFP population over time.  
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APPENDIX A 
  
Table 6. Bolsa Família Payment Schedule 
 Source: Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome, 2013 
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Table 7. Regression Models 1 - 6 
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 Table 8. Regression Results for Interaction Variables in Models 4 - 6 
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